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Introduction
Lindbeck and Snower (2001) investigate the effects of multitasking and team-
work on the viability of centralised bargaining. The authors emphasize that
workers likely have private information concerning their task mix when mul-
titasking plays a significant role in the production process. They try to show
in a formal model that only a complex remuneration scheme provides incen-
tives for workers to choose an optimal task mix and suggest that centralized
wage setting cannot tackle this complexity.
Unfortunately the authors miss to specify and analyze the basic assump-
tion regarding private information of the workers explicitly. A closer inspec-
tion of the issue reveals that – contrary to the claims of the authors – the
wage scheme resulting from their model is either not necessary or not imple-
mentable for the relevant information structure and therefore does not solve
the considered information problem. We start with a short summary of Lind-
beck & Snower’s model, followed by a discussion of the relevant information
structure and the central problem of their model. The rest of the comment is
devoted to some remarks on the role of teamwork and multi-tasking within
firms.
A short summary of the model
Lindbeck & Snower consider the profit maximization problem of a firm whose
production function q(λ1, λ2) requires two labour inputs (tasks) in quantities
λ1 and λ2. These tasks are performed by two types of workers. Workers of
each type can perform both tasks. According to the Lindbeck & Snower ter-
minology, a holistic firm is characterized (and distinguished from tayloristic
firms) by the fact that both worker types perform both tasks in a production
optimum but type 1 workers have a comparative advantage in performing
type 1 tasks in the sense e1/e2 > E1/E2 where ei denote efficiency units
for type 1 workers when performing task i and Ei denote the corresponding
measures for type 2 workers. In general, lowercase letters are used for type 1
workers and uppercase for type 2 workers. The ei and Ei are functions of the
task mix, i.e. ei = ei(τ), Ei = Ei(T ) where τ and T denote the share of gross
working time a worker devotes to task i.1 Together with the definition of
1In the paper the functional dependence of the ei and Ei is decomposed further in the
form ei = ei(si, ci) where s1 = s1(τ) and s2 = s2(t− τ) denote the effects of specialization
and complementarity on workers’ productivity respectively. Again the specification of
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the ei and Ei and the production function a full representation of the model
consists of the inputs
λ1 = e1 τ n+ E1 (1− T )N (1)
λ2 = e2 (1− τ)n+ E1 T N, (2)
the worker utility functions
u = w1 τ + w2 (1− τ) + v(τ) (3)
U = W1 (1− T ) +W2 T + V (T ) (4)
and participation constraints
w1 τ + w2 (1− τ) ≥ v(τ) (5)
W1 (1− T ) +W2 T ≥ V (T ) (6)
(7)
where v(τ) and V (T ) represent preferences of specialization/diversification.2
In the formulas the wi, (Wi) denote wages for the respective tasks and n, (N)
the number of workers of type 1, (2). After substitution of the ei and Ei,
output can be written as
q = q(τ, T, n,N)
and the cost function has the form
κ = {w1 τ + w2 (1− τ)}n+ {W1 (1− T ) +W2 T}N
By straightforward maximization of the profit function subject to partici-
pation constraints, Lindbeck & Snower derive a wage structure (from the
maximizing values τ ∗, T ∗, n∗, N∗) where w1 6= W1 and w2 6= W2 in general if
full specialisation does not occur (formally, if 0 < τ ∗ < 1 and 0 < T ∗ < 1).3
This means, for example, that type 1 and type 2 workers obtain different
wages for performing task 1.
The authors conclude that this flexible form of wage setting is incompati-
ble with central collective bargaining, since centralized wage setting does not
allow such complex wage structures. To emphasize the problem they note
that the number of tasks is much larger in most firms and the number of
required wages rises quickly with the number of tasks and worker types. As
noted above, the assumption that the task mix (i.e. the parameters τ and
T in their terminology) cannot be observed by the employer (principal), is
central for the model.
the Ei is fully analogous (with uppercase symbols) E1 = E1(S1(1 − T ), C1(T )). This is
irrelevant for the main point and therefore ignored here.
2Of course, v(τ) and V (T ) must be negative.
3In the case of full specialization only two instead of four wages are needed.
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The consistency problem
We anchor a discussion of the information structure with a quotation from
Lindbeck & Snower’s paper. On page 1860 they write:
“An important aspect of multi-tasking, documented in the recent
empirical literature, is that employees often have discretion over
the proportions in which different tasks are performed. In prac-
tice, employers generally determine the range of tasks that each
of their employees perform, while the employees often have some
latitude in deciding the task mix... Beyond that, task mixing is
usually difficult to monitor, and thus managers often have lit-
tle alternative but to leave some of the decision making to the
employees. Managers can, however, influence their employees de-
cisions through wage incentives. These wage incentives may be
distorted through centralized wage bargaining.”
Several interpretations are possible here. In the simplest one (the hidden
action case) the principal does not observe τ and T but has knowledge of
all other entities. In other possible (and probably relevant) interpretions
(the hidden information case) workers have private information over their
preferences (relative disutilities associated with the tasks) or the efficiency
unit functions ei and Ei. Lindbeck & Snower’s formal analysis is restricted
to thee first (hidden action) case.
The central problem of the model can then be formulated in one sentence:
Since τ and T appear in the remuneration functions, Lindbeck & Snower’s
wage scheme cannot be implemented. Put differently, opportunistic workers
disregard wages in their utility optimisation problems and simply set v′(τ) =
0 to obtain their optimum task mix if τ and T cannot be observed. Contrary
to their claims, the authors set up and solve a fully deterministic model of
symmetric information. In the deterministic case, however, the principal
simply prescribes an optimum task mix for every type and determines wages
(call them ω and Ω) such that they meet the participation constraints, e.g.
ω := v(τ ∗),Ω := V (T ∗). In practice the problem is solved in centralised
wage setting by specifying wages for a typical task mix instead of for all
tasks separately. The number of wages to be determined is unaffected by
this change. Of course, these standard wages are only approximations to
a perfectly efficient choice. But it is quite naive to expect that a principal
(or the market) is able to determine exact optimising wages for a firm with
3
10 worker types and 50 tasks (just try to compute the number of resulting
wages!).
Is there a way to trick employees into choosing the optimal task mix when
it is not observable? The standard advice from information economics is to
make wages contingent upon output. If the principal ties remuneration to
output, we have to specify whether he observes only gross output q of the
whole labour force or individual outputs. The central role of multitasking
and teamwork in the investigated issue is suggestive for the first alternative.4
Then the results from Holmstro¨m (1982) apply. Holmstro¨m investigates a
situation where output produced by a team of agents can be observed by all
players but the individual contributions of the agents are private information.
He shows that the team production moral hazard problem can be solved
efficiently via a simple group punishment incentive scheme: If production
equates the output attainable with the social optimum values of τ and T ,
the principal distributes gross revenues such that the wage of each worker is
(at least marginally) above his disutility of effort v(τ ∗) or V (T ∗). If it falls
short this level, every worker gets nothing.5
Several observations are in order here. First, Holmstro¨m’s scheme does
not require different wages for different tasks. The earnings of each worker
(strictly speaking: each worker type) depend on his disutility of effort and
the number of wages equals the number of worker types. It suffices to set a
severe group punishment and every worker (type) will choose the optimum
task mix. Otherwise productivity would fall short of the objective and trigger
group punishment.6
Put simply, hidden action and hidden information problems generate de-
pendency of wages on output, but especially if teamwork and cooperation
play a significant role in production, these remuneration schemes are rather
simple, i.e. every worker group obtains one wage.
4For related models where individual outputs are observable but production of a workers
depends on inputs of his colleagues see Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1990).
5Holmstro¨m notes that this scheme is not the only viable and other solutions, for
example bonding, are possible.
6The punishment scheme can be replaced by a bonus scheme. This is mainly a matter
of semantics.
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An alternative view of teamwork and multi-tasking
We conclude the comment by some remarks regarding the involved prob-
lems. Among its formal problems, Lindbeck & Snower’s model is based on a
one-sided and too a narrow view of flexibility, job-rotation, teamwork multi-
tasking.
Firstly, though Lindbeck & Snower stress the importance of flexibility
at the workplaces of holistic firms in the motivation of their model, they
hide this central issue in the formal part by assuming a static environment
(production function, product demand etc.) resulting in time-invariant op-
timum task mix parameters. In contrast, the relevant descriptive literature
characterises holistic firms by permanently changig task mix parameters.
Consequently the central question of such a model should be how to provide
incentives for workers to respond themselves to changing production demands
by selecting the necessary tasks. This issue is often not modelled explicitly
in the information economics and efficiency wage literature as a matter of
abstraction. Nevertheless the solutions in the literature apply exactly and
in a selv-evident manner to the situation modelled by Lindbeck & Snower’s
paper.
Secondly, it should be clear that job rotation, teamwork and multitasking
are solutions of the information problems of firms. Job rotation is a prereq-
uisite for promotion in many firms. For future managers and leaders this is
not only an opportunity to become acquainted with certain tasks but also to
get some experience on mean work load, task-specific disutility of effort, spe-
cialization gains and synergies with other tasks. This information gathering
function of job rotation is probably more important than learning specific
tasks. And more importantly, task-mixing and teamwork are also systems
of mutual monitoring. If every worker knows her colleagues’ tasks from own
experience, she will unmask false claims and shirking of her colleagues – at
least if they imply disadvantages for her. Employees not complying with
the concept of homo oeconomicus will do even more – in many cases to the
benefit of the firm.
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